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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 
IN LATIN AMERICA: 
A FOCUS ON THE POLICIES OF 
CHILE, ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
Frances Leighton 
Introduction 
The economic transformation of the coun-
tries in Latin America is an on-going process 
with success varying among the countries. The 
region has received much outside attention as it 
progresses politically, economically, and social-
ly; and its countries often have been urged to 
look to Chile as a model due to the enormous 
success of her economic transformation. 
However, although the economy of Chile has 
undergone vast improvements, it has been large-
ly at the expense of the social sector, causing the 
gap between the rich and the poor to widen. 
This paper examines the transformation of 
the Chilean economy, highlighting the success-
es it has achieved as well as the problems that 
have occurred throughout the transition. The 
experiences of two other countries in Latin 
America have also been selected for comparison 
- Argentina and Brazil - to provide a broad-
er perspective on the Latin American region. 
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An Economic Overview of the Latin 
American Region 
Latin America includes countries in South 
America, Central America and the Caribbean. 
It was not untill826 that all of the countries in 
the Latin American region achieved indepen-
dence, and by this time the economic structure 
was outward-oriented. By this I mean that the 
region's growth depended on external forces 
and that the economy of Latin America fluctu-
ated with changes in foreign economic condi-
tions. The Great Depression that began in 1929 
in the United States resulted in severe reper-
cussions for the Latin American region, and it 
became necessary to implement an inward-
looking strategy, based on economic diversifi-
cation and import substitution industrializa-
tion (lSI). However, not enough attention was 
given to promoting exports, which would 
enable Latin America to achieve substantial 
growth. There was also a continued dependence 
on the United States and Europe, 96th of which 
invested extensively in the Latin American mar-
ket and acted as lenders to the region. At first, 
the increase in commodity prices of products 
such as petroleum caused Latin American 
exports to rise; however, the world recession 
that ensued caused a decrease in prices and a 
rise in interest rates as foreign countries 
attempted to gain control over inflation. This 
impeded Latin American exports and made it 
difficult for her to pay back the significant debt 
owed to foreign creditors. The extraordinary 
level of foreign debt and the slow economic 
growth of the region led governments to inter-
vene as a means of regulating their economies. 
(Dietz, pp. 7-8) 
It became apparent that a new economic 
model was imperative to generate sufficient 
capital to make the extensive debt payments 
that the Latin American region incurred. 
Therefore, in the late 1980s a new policy known 
as the Washington Consensus was formed, 
focusing on the market instead of on the state 
as the primary means for progress in Latin 
America. It is based on neo-liberal policies, 
mainly the creation of a trade surplus, trade lib-
eralization, privatization and domestic capital 
reform. The implementation of these reforms 
continues today, with success varying among 
the countries throughout the region. 
Both positive and negative results of this 
model have been seen throughout the Latin 
American region. For example, the overall annu-
al inflation rate for the region has been cut from 
196 percent in 1991 to 19 percent in 1995. 
(Wilson) Domestic reforms aimed at controlling 
capital accounts and guiding investment into cap-
ital-intensive activities have resulted in greater 
domestic savings, as well as increasing the flow 
of foreign money into the Latin American econ-
omy. Finally, the privatization of many busi-
nesses was achieved by reducing government 
expenditures and increasing revenue through the 
sale of assets. However, the detrimental effects 
that this model has had with respect to both 
poverty and income distribution cast a shadow 
over the economic progress of the region. 
As the 20th century ends, little progress 
has been made in reducing the social inequali-
ties that exist throughout Latin America. The 
previously discussed economic reforms that 
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were implemented have frequently benefited 
only the upper and middle classes, thereby 
widening the gap between the rich and the poor. 
One of the key reasons for the considerable eco-
nomic inequality is the large number of uned-
ucated individuals in the lower classes who do 
not possess the skills needed in many areas. 
Due to the lack of opportunities to further their 
education, it is difficult for them to gain the 
necessary knowledge to advance in the work 
environment and in society. Educational 
reform, such as advanced training programs for 
teachers, is vital for the progress of Latin 
America. Many of the countries lack the funds 
that are necessary to implement such pro-
grams; however, an even bigger concern is that 
these funds are often used ineffectively. 
The Chilean Miracle 
Among all of the countries of Latin 
America, Chile has seen the most success in the 
implementation of the new economic policies 
mentioned above. The country has undergone 
such a remarkable economic transformation 
that its development is known worldwide as the 
"Chilean miracle." Chile is considered to have 
the most stable economy in Latin America and 
has maintained steady economic growth for the 
last ten years. Also, democracy has been 
restored in a peaceful manner that is highly 
regarded by countries worldwide. In fact, Chile 
underwent a dual transition because the econ-
omy changed to a neo-liberal system as the gov-
ernment was transformed from a military dic-
tatorship to a democracy. 
There are two principal reasons for the suc-
cessful incorporation of the reforms under the 
new economic model. The first is the fact that 
Chile implemented the reforms earlier than 
most other countries, beginning in 1973 after 
the Popular Unity government was overthrown 
by the military coup. Secondly, the military dic-
tatorship pushed for the quick implementation 
of the reforms. (Bulmer-Thomas, p. 147) 
The coup that ensued in 1973 not only 
transformed the previous socialist government 
to a military dictatorship, but also resulted in a 
dramatic shift in economic policies. When 
Pinochet took over the government, inflation 
was high and increasing rapidly, the deficit was 
almost 25 percent of GDP, and foreign financ-
ing and international reserves were unavailable. 
(Bosworth, p. 34) Under the Pinochet regime, 
the economy was changed to a free market sys-
tem with an open door policy that relied on 
diversified exports. This economic change came 
about principally through several reforms that 
took place beginning in 1973. The first reform, 
and the main focus of the military government, 
was the attempt to control inflation. This was 
achieved mainly by reducing the budget deficit 
from 25 percent of GOP in 1973 to 1 percent in 
1975; and in each of the following 5 years, Chile 
experienced a budget surplus. One of the key 
reasons for this accomplishment was the mass 
privatization, which resulted in a decrease in 
publicly controlled enterprises from more than 
500 in 1973 to only 43 in 1980. (Bulmer-
Thomas, p. 148) 
The next Chilean reform was the liberal-
ization of trade. In the early 1970s, strict con-
trols were placed on almost all prices in order 
to keep inflation down. However, through the 
liberalization of trade, these controls were lift-
ed and prices were freed. Domestic trade 
reforms led to the adoption of a single exchange 
rate and a 10 percent tariff. Eliminating restric-
tions on credit, terminating preferential financ-
ing, and allowing non-bank financial institu-
tions and foreign banks to conduct business 
liberalized the domestic financial market. A 20 
percent value-added tax, imposed on all goods 
and services in place of a sales tax, became the 
principal revenue source for the government. 
(Meller, pp. 27 -28) 
These reforms were implemented with the 
help of a group known as the "Chicago Boys," 
who had the complete support of Pinochet. 
This was a group of economists from the 
Catholic University in Chile who had partici-
pated in an exchange program through which 
they studied at the University of Chicago begin-
ning in the 1950s. When they returned from 
their studies at Chicago, many of them assumed 
public positions in Chile, bringing with them 
their new ideologies. Over the years, the num-
ber of students who participated in the 
exchange increased and so the group known as 
the "Chicago Boys" grew. They were concerned 
about the government and its role with regard 
to economic policies. They disagreed with the 
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ideas of Keynes, who believed that the govern-
ment should take on a significant role in the 
economy, and instead they sought to preserve 
the orthodox neo-classical theory in which gov-
ernment plays a minimal role. (Diaz, p. 84) 
The opening of the Chilean economy and 
the liberalization of trade caused growth at first, 
but in 1975 a recession occurred due to a fall in 
copper prices and an increase in oil prices. The 
negative effects on the Chilean economy were 
intensified as a result of strict tax reform, a 
reduction in public spending, and the increase 
in the price level due to the removal of controls. 
(Bosworth, p. 6) 
The economy began to recover by the late 
1970s; but the exchange rate that was adopted 
in 1979, which fixed the Chilean peso to the 
U.S. dollar, had a devastating impact on domes-
tic industry. The resulting overvaluation of the 
peso induced consumers to buy overseas, mak-
ing it impossible for local producers to compete 
with the low prices of imported goods. This was 
only one of a mixture of both domestic and for-
eign events that were responsible for the crisis 
of 1982 that occurred throughout Latin 
America. Some of the other events that initi-
ated the crisis include the continued fall in the 
price of copper, the generation of a high foreign 
debt, and the increase in foreign interest rates. 
(Bulmer-Thomas, pp. 148-49) 
All this resulted in the intervention of the 
government in 1982, which led to many large, 
private companies such as Bank of Chile and 
the Bank of Santiago being taken over by the 
state. The peso was devalued, enabling the 
exchange rate to settle at a reasonable level, 
which in turn allowed competitive exportation 
of Chilean goods. The nominal tariff rate was 
also increased, specific price controls were 
implemented as a means of protecting such 
domestic goods as wheat and sugar, and the 
state paid off the enormous external debt that 
Chile had accumulated through extensive for-
eign borrowing. (Bulmer-Thomas, p. 149) 
In 1985 there occurred two principal 
events that were to spur economic growth. The 
first was the depreciation of the real exchange 
rate, which lowered inflation. While other Latin 
American countries faced high inflation rates 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Chile was able 
to maintain a relatively low annual rate that 
declined steadily from 19.8 percent in the late 
1980s to 6.6 percent in 1996. As indicated in 
Table 1, this 1996 inflation rate was the lowest 
of any country in the region. 
Table 1 
Inflation Rates in Latin America 1985-1996a 
Country 1985-1989 1990-1995 1996 
Argentina 468.6% 81.2% 10.0% 
Brazil 453.5% 756.0% 9.2% 
Chile 19.8% 14.5% 6.6% 
Columbia 24.3% 24.8% 21.6% 
Ecuador 43.1% 39.0% 25.5% 
Mexico 73.8% 20.3% 27.7% 
Peru 445.9% 183.1% 11.8% 
Venezuela 32.5% 44.8% 103.6% 
•average annual rates 
Table provided by Hernan Btichi during a presentation to 
the Martindale group given at University Adolfo Ibanez on 
June 2, 1998. 
The second factor spurring Chilean economic 
growth was the fiscal policy imposed to increase 
domestic savings, which changed the public sec-
tor trade deficit in 1984 into a trade surplus by 
1989. Other growth-inducing factors included 
the re-privatization of banks and large corpora-
tions, the initial privatization of many other cor-
porations, the restructuring of the financial sys-
tem, and the diversification of exports. 
(Bosworth, p. 9) 
According to Arturo Valenzuela, Chile's 
economic success has often been attributed to 
the military government and its ability to imple-
ment strict reforms. Although he does not 
attribute Chile's success solely to the govern-
ment, he does believe that it played a crucial role 
in the country's economic transformation. The 
political autonomy that existed in Chile under 
Pinochet's dictatorship was greater than that of 
other countries throughout the region, thereby 
facilitating the implementation of reforms. The 
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private sector in Chile was also not nearly as 
strong as the private sectors of other countries, 
due to businesses being adversely affected by 
the earlier reforms during the presidencies of 
Frei and Allende in Chile. It was therefore 
much easier for the military to carry out its pro-
grams without the interference of the business 
class. (Valenzuela, 1997) 
Effects on Chilean Social Conditions 
Many of the policies implemented during 
the 1980s had effects that led to the present 
inequalities within Chilean society. For exam-
ple, the fiscal adjustment program that was 
implemented as a means to stabilize the econ-
omy led to an unequal distribution of govern-
ment subsidies. Individuals who were in debt 
but who owned assets were given preferential 
treatment by the government. This resulted 
in fewer than 2,000 debtors receiving subsidies 
that totaled 3 percent of GDP while 600,000 
unemployed workers were receiving unem-
ployment subsidies that totaled only 1.5 per-
cent of GDP. (Meller, p. 15) 
The unequal income distribution has 
resulted in Chile being ranked 7th in the world 
with regard to the unevenness of her income 
distribution. (Cooper, p. 13) Table 2 provides 
information regarding the distribution of 
income with regard to urban households in 
Chile, along with similar information for 
Argentina and Brazil. It shows only a minor 
change in the Chilean distribution of income 
between 1987 (when the poorest 5th received 
4.4 percent of total income, while the richest 
5th received 56.1 percent) and 1994 (when the 
numbers were 4. 7 percent and 55.6 percent, 
respectively). However, although this is only a 
slight improvement, it occurred over a rela-
tively short seven-year time period, thereby 
demonstrating a change for the better in the 
distribution of income. 
Table 2 
Distribution of Income in Urban Households in Argentina, Brazil and Chilea 
Country Year Quintile 1 (poorest) Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 (richest) 
Argentina 1980 6.8 10.6 15.7 21.7 45.1 
1986 6.4 9.8 15.2 19.9 48.7 
1990 6.2 8.7 14.2 20.9 50.0 
1992 5.9 9.3 15.1 22.3 47.5 
1994 5.0 8.8 14.1 21.0 51.1 
Brazil 1979 3.9 7.9 12.2 20.0 56.0 
1987 3.0 6.8 10.9 18.6 60.8 
1990 3.1 6.6 11.1 19.7 60.5 
1993 4.0 7.8 11.1 18.5 55.8 
Chile 1987 4.4 8.3 12.8 19.4 56.1 
1990 4.7 8.7 12.1 18.7 55.0 
1992 4.9 8.7 12.8 18.9 55.2 
1994 4.7 8.7 12.4 18.7 55.6 
•classified by per capita income 
The information above is the percent of income distributed within society, divided into quintiles, highlighting the richest and 
poorest sectors. 
Table is from p. 51 of The Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (1996) and is published by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The decline in the educational system may 
be the worst repercussion that Chileans experi-
enced under Pinochet's dictatorship. Before the 
military regime, almost 100 percent of school-
age children were enrolled in school. However, 
under Pinochet all public schools were turned 
over to municipalities, and a new kind of school 
was created, called a "mixed school," which was 
privately subsidized. Money was given to schools . 
based on enrollment; and due to the govern-
ment's attempts to attract students to the mixed 
schools, proportionally more money was dis-
tributed to these schools. By 1982 allocations 
to public schools were cut off in an attempt to 
close them, and in 1988 the percent of GOP des-
ignated to federal education funding had fallen 
by over 50 percent from what it had been previ-
ous to Pinochet's policies. (Solowey, p. 23) This 
results in the economy being deprived of more 
highly educated workers. An education is cru-
cial in order to advance in the work force and 
achieve greater social status within society. 
Norbert Lechner has recently published a 
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study on social development in Chile, in which 
he analyzes the degree of discontent in Chilean 
society. His findings indicate that insecurity, 
stemming from the following primary con-
cerns, is the central source of uneasiness with-
in the population. First, Chileans have a lack 
of confidence due to the history of the country. 
They sense that there is a "fragile order of life," 
resulting in their inability to rely on others. 
There is also a grave sense of distrust in the gov-
ernmental system, especially when it comes to 
health and job opportunities. Even those who 
are currently employed are not certain of the 
stability of their jobs, and many are frightened 
that they may have to seek employment else-
where in the near future. These fears are 
heightened because Chileans feel as though 
they have limited access to information and that 
what they hear is unreliable. (Lechner) 
Having briefly described the economic and 
social conditions that currently exist in Chile, 
let us now examine some of the reforms under-
taken to transform the economies of other 
countries in Latin America. Each country's 
progress is a result not only of the policies 
implemented, but also of the political and social 
structures as well as the historical factors that 
are unique to each country. By taking a brief 
glance at Argentina and Brazil, we can draw 
some interesting comparisons to Chile. 
Argentina and the Convertibility Plan 
Chile's neighbor to the east, Argentina, 
also underwent the political change from a dic-
tatorship to a democracy. Moreover, like Chile, 
the policies implemented aided Argentina in its 
quest for economic growth. However, 
Argentina's economic transition occurred much 
later than Chile's, and significant prosperity was 
not achieved until the 1990s. 
Argentina experienced generally sluggish 
economic growth over the fifty-year period 
spanning 1940 to 1990. This was primarily due 
to extensive public sector deficits and high lev-
els of inflation. After the country became a con-
stitutional democracy in 1983, various political 
leaders attempted to create a system that would 
stabilize the economy, but each one failed. 
Although temporary success was achieved in 
decreasing the inflation rate, the increase in the 
public sector deficit caused the annual inflation 
rate to rebound. In 1988, the inflation rate 
reached a high of 386 percent. (Enderlyn and 
Dziggel, p. 4) 
Carlos Menem was elected president in 
1989, and he proceeded to implement the so-
called Convertibility Plan, whose main purpose 
was to tackle Argentina's problem of high infla-
tion. Mass privatization of businesses took 
place, as well as the implementation of a vari-
ety of other reforms, including the fixing of the 
exchange rate. The exchange rate was perma-
nently fixed at one Argentine peso to one U.S. 
dollar; and according to the regulations of the 
Plan, the peso cannot be devalued or revalued. 
(Azpiazu) The result was a decline in the 
Argentine inflation rate to 10 percent in 1996, 
the third lowest rate in Latin America after 
Chile and Brazil. (See Table 1) 
As in Chile, vast income inequalities exist 
within Argentine society. In 1986 the poorest 
5th received 6.4 percent of the country's 
income, while the richest 5th received 48.7 per-
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cent. This gap has continued to widen since the 
Convertibility Plan, and by 1994 these numbers 
were 6 percent and 60.1 percent, respectively. 
(See Table 2) 
According to Daniel Azpiazu, the social dis-
parities that exist within Argentina may have 
been significantly less if it had not been for the 
neo-liberal economic policies of Menem's 
Convertibility Plan, which he refers to as the 
"neo-liberal sock package." One of these reforms 
was the freeing of capital flows, which has led to 
an influx of short-term capital and increased 
Argentina's foreign debt and economic instabil-
ity. Price deregulation and privatization have 
also had negative effects on the economy. 
Although they were aimed at increasing the vol-
ume of foreign investment, most capital invest-
ed have been speculative, not long-term, and 
was withdrawn if trouble loomed on the hori-
zon, thereby adding to the economic instability 
of Argentina. Azpiazu believes that if these 
"reforms" had been excluded from the Plan, the 
increase in foreign debt would have been avoid-
ed and with it the growing inequality of income. 
The Brazilian Experience 
Due to the size of its economy, Brazil's 
experience has differed greatly from those of 
both Chile and Argentina. Brazil was slower to 
accept the policies laid out by the Washington 
Consensus discussed earlier, and was one of the 
last countries in the Latin American region to 
implement them. Although the Brazilian gov-
ernment recognized the need to take action and 
various reforms were deliberated, no adjustment 
policies were formulated, and a successful sta-
bilization plan was not achieved until the 1990s. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil had the 
fastest growing economy in Latin America, and 
was one of the largest borrowers of foreign cur-
rency. This resulted in severe consequences for 
the Brazilian economy when the previously 
mentioned debt crisis occurred in 1982. Not 
only was the country unable to recover from the 
crisis, but the inefficient management of public 
finances and extensive state intervention led to 
a budget deficit that increased steadily through-
out the 1980s, reaching a high of 24.9 percent 
of GDP in 1989. (Bulmer-Thomas, p. 251) 
In 1990 several structural reforms were 
finally implemented, including trade liberal-
ization, deregulation of prices, and privatiza-
tion. Trade reforms eliminated import restric-
tions on close to 2,000 goods, and nominal 
tariffs were reduced. The deregulation program 
abolished such economic restrictions as quotas 
on domestic production and distribution of 
products such as wheat, fuel, and coal. Finally, 
as a result of privatization, sales reached $9.7 
billion in 1991, the majority of which was gen-
erated by domestic investment due to the legal 
restrictions on foreign investment. (World Bank 
Group: Brazil, 1999) 
In 1994 Brazil initiated its first truly suc-
cessful stabilization plan, called the Real Plan, 
which is based upon a strict monetary policy. 
Brazil's new currency, the Real, provided the 
name for the Plan, and it entailed fixing the 
Brazilian currency to the U.S. dollar. The Plan 
had the effect of slashing the annual inflation 
rate in Brazil from an unbelievable 2,500 per-
cent in 1990 to only 9.2 percent by 1996. The 
result was that most everyone received a salary 
"increase," including the poorest workers who 
experienced significant growth in income 
throughout the 1990s. (Weinberger, p. 37) (See 
Table 1) In 1987, only 3 percent of national 
income was received by the poorest 5th in Brazil 
while the richest 5th received 60.8 percent. 
However, between 1994 and 1995, the poorest 
workers experienced a rise in per capita income. 
Their income increased by 30 percent while the 
highest income workers saw an increase of only 
10 percent. (Clements) Also, the non-financial 
industry, which employs a large percent of 
unskilled workers, flourished within this time 
period, increasing the income of low-income 
workers. The effect of this income growth has 
been a sharp decline in the percentage of the 
Brazilian population living in poverty. 
Although Brazil has experienced some 
improvement with regard to income distribu-
tion and poverty, it still has the largest gap 
between the rich and the poor in the world. 
(Clements) Income inequality in Brazil is the 
direct effect of the lack of educational opportu-
nities. According to the 1997 report released by 
the United Nations Children's Fund, 5 million 
Brazilian children between ages 5 and 14 are 
working, even though the legal working age is 
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15. (Luis) Instead of enrolling in schools, many 
of these children are working 12-hour days, if 
not more. It is nearly impossible for children 
within the poor classes to advance in society 
because they are not given the necessary tools 
and information provided by proper schooling 
that will aid them in obtaining higher positions 
within society. (Aguilera) It is imperative that 
all children have educational opportunities in 
order for Brazil to achieve any improvement in 
the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Chile's Comparative Success 
This brief examination of the policies 
undertaken in Argentina and Brazil allows for 
a comparison of Chile's relative success within 
Latin America. Chile's success can be partly 
attributed to the fact that Pinochet used his role 
as a dictator to take immediate action in order 
to enforce his reforms quickly and effectively. 
He not only had the support of the "Chicago 
Boys" and the military, but the lack of a strong 
private sector in Chile also resulted in little out-
side interference with his programs. Although 
Argentina's form of government was also a dic-
tatorship, it had experienced years of political 
incompetence before Menem came to power. 
This resulted in a much slower adoption of 
sound economic policies, as well as public 
weariness with regard to both Menem and his 
Plan due to the incompetence of prior govern-
mental officials. The government of Brazil dif-
fered from that of Chile and Argentina in that 
there was not a dictator ruling during its peri-
od of economic reform. As with Argentina, it 
took many years to create an effective stabi-
lization plan, and by that point economic con-
ditions were such that improvement, however 
slight, was inevitable. 
Of the three countries, Argentina has the 
smallest income gap between the richest and 
poorest sectors of the population. However, as 
Table 2 shows, this gap has actually widened 
between 1980 and 1994. The degree of income 
inequality in Brazil has fluctuated over this 
time period, while Chile has experienced a nar-
rowing of the rich-poor gap. In none of the 
three countries, however, have the changes 
been pronounced. 
Additional Perspectives on Latin 
America's Progress 
MORI is an organization in Chile that 
publishes an annual press release entitled 
"Latinobar6metro," which is a public opinion 
survey in which 17 Latin American countries 
and Spain participate. Its purpose is to obtain 
information regarding citizens' perspectives on 
political, economic, and social issues. There 
are three primary focuses of the survey: inter-
national relations and trade agreements, 
democracy and its evaluation, and perceptions 
about the economy. In the 1996 survey 21,198 
interviews were conducted and the following 
information is based on those responses. 
(MORI, 1996) 
Graph 1: 
There is an important distinction between 
support for a democratic government and sat-
isfaction with the democratic system. As Graph 
2 shows, the average satisfaction level with 
democratic systems within the Latin American 
region is only 27 percent, and Uruguay is the 
only country with a satisfaction level above 50 
percent. Much of the dissatisfaction stems from 
the popular belief that, although democratic 
systems are in place, there is a lot that still 
needs to be done to achieve full democracy. 
This belief is extremely high in Brazil and 
Colombia where democracy is supported, but 
where many are dissatisfied with their coun-
try's democratic system. However, even with 
the high level of dissatisfaction, it can be seen 
in Graph 3 that the majority of Latin Americans 
Society's Preferences with Regard to the Governmental System 
90 T---~~------~--~~------~----------------------~ 
BO+mr---------------------------------------------------4 
70~~--~--------------------------------------------~ 
Democracy is now present in all countries 
throughout Latin America, and democratic 
institutions are being created in countries that 
were previously dominated by the military and 
where public opinion was suppressed. Public 
support for a democratic system is varied 
among the different counties, however, as is 
shown in Graph 1. In Peru, for example, more 
than 60 percent of its citizens support democ-
racy, while in Chile the number is 54 percent. 
In Brazil, this number is only 50 percent, and 
it has one of the highest rates of support for an 
authoritative government at 24 percent. 
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~ Prefer Democracy 
• Prefer Authoritarianism 
IS No Preference 
still defend democracy and realize the impor-
tance it holds in maintaining order. Chile is 
somewhat unique, however. Although its eco-
nomic performance is the best in Latin 
America, only 54 percent of those Chileans 
polled would defend democracy, which is the 
lowest percentage of those countries polled. 
Finally, information was also obtained from 
the MORI poll as to what citizens believe to be 
their country's biggest problem. Many citizens' 
perceptions of economic and social conditions 
differ from reality. For example, although the 
inflation rate has declined and Latin America has 
Graph 2: 
Society's Satisfaction with the Democratic System 
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Graph 3: 
Society's Willingness to Defend Democracy 
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Source: MORI, Latinobar6metro, 1996. 
experienced overall economic growth, these 
improvements have gone unnoticed by many. 
However, the statistics and popular belief are in 
accordance with regard to unemployment and 
education, both of which remain critical prob-
lems among Latin Americans. 
Conclusions 
Latin America has recently undergone sig-
nificant reforms in transforming itself to a more 
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open economic system that is becoming com-
petitive with the rest of the world. Significant 
progress has been achieved with regard to 
reducing the inflation rate. And although each 
country is unique in its experiences due to vary-
ing political structures and differences in the 
methods used to implement reforms, as a whole 
the region has experienced considerable eco-
nomic growth. However, despite the region's 
economic successes, serious social problems 
remain. Widespread income inequality contin-
ues to exist, and the educational systems need 
to be improved. 
By comparing the relative experiences of 
Argentina and Brazil under economic reform, 
readers can evaluate Chile's achievements. Her 
inflation rate, which is the lowest in Latin 
America, and her GNP growth rate are both evi-
dence of Chile's successful transformation. 
However, since some of this progress has 
occurred at the expense of the social sector, 
Chile should not necessarily be used as a model 
for other countries to follow. 
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